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Abstract 
The role of economic actors and transnational corporations in transforming the world’s 
political and economic order has received increased attention. However, it is still 
controversial to what extent private governance regimes operate in an effective ‘shadow 
of hierarchy’. In other words, it is debated the extent to which governments and 
international organizations are able to regulate and exert their powers over transnational 
social and economic actors. This paper uses the case of world football’s governing 
body, FIFA, to investigate the extent to which sport international actors may condition 
the decisions of democratically elected national governments. The paper provides 
comparative case study evidence that FIFA as football’s global regulator has been able 
to force national governments to abandon legislation and interference in football’s 
matters even in case of blatant failures of football’s governance. Research supports the 
claim that private regimes providing unique governance contributions represent an 
institutional equilibrium able to resist challenges. FIFA’s ‘victories’ over national 
governments demonstrate the political leverage of football and its governing body, but 
they are highly problematic since they discourage national governments to fight 
misconduct in sport, while it can be doubted that sport organizations alone can deal with 
the regulatory problems at stake. 
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Introduction 
Governance by non-state actors has received increasing scholarly attention (Peters 
and Pierre 1998; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Büthe, 2009). The legitimacy and 
effects of transnational private governance or authority have been hotly debated. As 
research intensified, scholars realized that the diversity and complexity of private 
transnational governance calls for more detailed empirical research in order to allow 
for more general conclusions (Bexell et al. 2012). However, although the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) founded in 1894 and the International 
Federation of Association Football (FIFA) founded in 1904, are older than most 
intergovernmental institutions, the highly sophisticated transnational private 
governance regime in sport – that has actively claimed its ‘autonomy’ from state law 
and public authorities (Chappelet 2010) – has hardly been examined. 
Furthermore, conflicts between FIFA and governments around the world have 
occurred relatively frequently prompting the question whether these conflicts follow 
any patterns. Thus, this piece of problem-driven research explores what enables 
FIFA to challenge the authority of sovereign states. The objective is to produce some 
conceptual propositions from the structured and analytical observation of those 
events. Moreover, we consider FIFA an interesting case of an authoritative 
transnational private sports federation, whose exploration might generate some 
propositions, even if modest, for other classes of private authority.  
The research approach adopted is inductive. We provide first an overview of 
the conflicts between FIFA and governments in the last decade. Then we present 
three in-depth case studies on the conflicts between FIFA and the governments of 
Greece, Spain and Poland. In order ‘to identify the intervening causal process’ 
(George and Bennett 2005: 206-207) we employ process tracing and present careful 
case descriptions (Mahoney, 2010, 125–31) relying on written sources such as 
FIFA’s press releases, FIFA’s website articles, press articles, government documents 
and secondary academic sources.  
The evidence suggests that FIFA is able to actively defend the autonomy of 
its private governance regime vis-à-vis legitimately and democratically elected 
governments even when misconduct in sport governance is involved. We argue that 
FIFA’s authority results from a rather unique concentration of powers and favorable 
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socioeconomic trends. FIFA does not hesitate to use its monopoly powers to force 
governmental authorities to revoke unwelcome legislation. It seems that FIFA’s 
authority can hardly be contested by national governments on their own.  
 
Private governance 
Since Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) governance by non-state actors has occupied the 
attention of scholars. Whereas global governance refers to ‘social functions or 
processes that can be performed or implemented in a variety of ways at different 
times and places’ (Rosenau 2002, 72), ‘the core of the global governance argument 
concerns the acquisition of authoritative decision-making capacity by non-state and 
supra-state actors’ (Fuchs 2002, 11). Although private transborder regulation (Greiff 
et al. 1994) and complex states-society collaborations (Zumbasen 2010) have existed 
before, the participation of non-state actors in public policy has now become 
commonplace among scholars (Mattli and Büthe 2005; Büthe 2010; Shamir 2011). 
Whilst non-state actors are quite diverse, transnational private authority can be 
defined as the ability of non-state actors to cooperate across borders in order to 
establish rules and standards of behavior accepted as legitimate by agents not 
involved in the rule definition (Graz and Nölke 2010, 3).  
Functionalist accounts depict the rise of private authority as based on explicit 
or implicit delegation of certain functions by the state (Cutler et al., 1999). Moreover, 
transnational private governance has arisen spontaneously in the vacuum left by the 
regulatory failure of ‘old international governance’ (Abbott and Snidal 2008, 577; cf. 
Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Bomhorr and Meuweuse 2011). In contrast to functionalist 
reasoning, it has been claimed that neoliberal ideology and the pursuit of corporate 
hegemony account for the rise of transnational private authority (Cutler et al. 1999; 
Johns 2007; Schäferhoff et al. 2009; Shamir 2011).  
Thus, it has been debated whether private governance undermines legitimate 
public authority or not. Börzel and Risse (2010, 116) claimed that private governance 
is subject to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. Accordingly, threats of state intervention 
catalyze ‘voluntary agreement[s] closer to the common good rather than to 
particularistic self-interests’. Other scholars stressed that powerful non-state actors 
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might challenge the authority of sovereign states (Sneding and Neumeier 2008, 654). 
Accordingly, ‘regime shopping’ has enabled TNCs to impose their own rules on state 
governments (Koenig-Archbugi 2004), in particular in developing countries 
unwilling and incapable to regulate (Abbott and Snidal 2008, 538). 
In terms of governance contributions it has been recently stressed that 
transnational private regimes serve to integrate social and environmental concerns 
into business operations (Abbott and Snidal 2008). Concerning legitimacy and 
power, scholars have demanded to go beyond the public-private divide (Pattberg and 
Stripple 2009). Since many significant private regulatory initiatives represent 
business-civil society collaborations (Abbott 2012) involving NGOs and multi-
stakeholder organizations (Caffaggi 2010), private transnational governance appears 
to be located in a governance triangle between public authorities, firms and NGOs 
(Abbott and Snidal 2008) where NGOs or legitimacy communities serve as ‘rule 
demander’ and supervisors of private regulation (Overdevest 2010) and states or 
intergovernmental organizations attempt to ‘orchestrate’ regulatory efforts. Due to 
the involvement of NGOs private transnational governance can even increase global 
democracy (Bexell et al. 2012). 
Moreover, analyses of private regimes have also to consider the targets of 
private regulation (Büthe 2010) since compliance is often voluntary (Abbott and 
Snidal 2008), although compliance might condition market access (Caffaggi 2010). 
Finally, the competition among private regulators poses needs for meta-regulation 
(Bomhorr and Meuweuse 2011) and for the ‘orchestration’ of private regulatory 
efforts (Abbott and Snidal 2008; Abbott 2012).  
Thus, the complexity and diversity of governance arrangements calls for 
further empirical evidence before general accounts of promises and pitfalls of private 
transnational authority can be presented (Bexell et al. 2012). Seen in the lights of the 
more recent debate on private governance in relation to…, FIFA’s regime already 
appears as exceptional. There is, first, no governance triangle in football in the sense 
of Abbott and Snidal (2008) since there are no NGOs countervailing FIFA’s power. 
Actually, FIFA can legitimately claim to be an NGO representing one of the world’s 
biggest grass root movements: the practice of association football. Moreover, states 
have so-far not actively tried to ‘orchestrate’ their efforts in international football 
regulation. Second, there is almost competition between private regulators in the 
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football sector. It is well documented the disagreement between clubs and 
professional leagues such as the English Premier League, on the one hand, and 
governing bodies (eg. UEFA or FIFA), on the other, on football governance issues 
like the employment regime of players, schedule of national team competitions or 
distribution of commercial rights, to name a few.  
Despite these peculiarities, some conclusions for the general debate about 
private transnational authority may still be learned from examining the case of FIFA. 
In order to do so we follow Büthe’s proposal (2010) to address the following 
questions: (1) How do private bodies attain regulatory authority, why do private 
regulators provide governance, and why do the targets of the rules comply?, (2) who 
governs the global economy though private regulation?, and (3) what are the effects 
of private regulation?  
 
How FIFA attained regulatory power 
In order to understand how FIFA attained regulatory power, we rely on historical 
institutionalism (HI) as organizing framework for our ‘problem driven’ approach. HI 
emphasizes that institutions emerge from and are embedded in specific temporal 
processes and a bigger socioeconomic environment (Thelen 1999). Whereas rational 
choice scholars stress the role of institutions as coordination mechanisms 
(Katznelson and Weingast 2005), HI emphasizes the incoherent and coercive 
character of institutions (Crouch 2005; Schneiberg 2006) and the relevance of power 
relations for institutional design (Streeck and Thelen 2005). HI is in particular suited 
to the analyses of sport governance because institutional configurations in sport 
fulfill coordinative needs but typically privilege specific actors (Meier 2008).   
 HI tends to treat preference formation as an endogenous process. 
Accordingly, institutions affect not only ‘the strategies but also the goals that actors 
pursue’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 8). For our purposes it suffices to assume that 
institutions can create new clienteles or strengthen the incentives of existing 
constituencies to push for institutional maintenance (Fioretos 2011, 377). 
Accordingly, we claim that global sport governance has managed to inspire political 
actors to ‘discover’ their preferences in international sports. 
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 HI scholars have put emphasis on mechanisms of institutional reproduction 
and stability (Pierson 1993, 2004). In essence, three basic mechanisms can be 
defined (Fioretos 2011): Positive feedback effects arise when institutions generate 
benefits motivating actors to support existing institutional arrangements; increasing 
returns exist when positive externalities from institutional designs steadily increase; 
and institutional complementarity occurs ‘when the presence (or efficiency) of one 
institution increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other’ (Hall and Soskice, 
2001, 17). Since HI’s emphasis on the self-reinforcing character of institutions bears 
the risk of over-predicting institutional stability (Thelen 2009, 473; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005, 8), it is necessary to reemphasize the incoherent and coercive character 
of institutions (Crouch, 2005; Schneiberg, 2006) and to specify positive feedback 
processes for certain subsets of affected actors (Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
In order to provide a ‘more complete explanation’ (cf. Thelen 1999, 380-1) of 
FIFA’s rise to regulatory power, we now apply this HI framework to analyze FIFA’s 
governance contributions and its socioeconomic embeddedness. Since institutional 
stability rests on the coalitional base of an institution (Thelen 2004, 33), we trace 
how FIFA’s far-reaching transformation into a TNC has brought a coalition of 
stakeholders into power determined to defend football’s autonomy from 
governmental intervention. 
FIFA’s Governance Contributions and Monopoly Powers 
The need for monopolies in sport governance has been long debated (Szymanski 
2003). Some monopoly structures seem desirable because most stakeholders of 
international sport gain the highest utility from ‘meaningful’ competitions (Neale 
1964). Meaningful competitions require clear and consistent rules, which are best 
provided by a regulatory monopoly (Scully 1995). Moreover, the interest in 
‘uncontested’ winners also creates a need for monopoly structures in competitions. 
Thus, FIFA provides a ‘definitional monopoly’ for international champions by 
defining football’s rules and by organizing the World Cup.  
However, FIFA’s control of access to international football clearly exceeds 
any functional needs and appears, even in sport, as exceptional. Thus, sports may 
also prosper under rivaling competitions as professional boxing illustrates (Tenorio 
2006). In professional cycling economic power rests with the organizers of the 
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cycling competitions and the sponsors but not with the sport governing bodies acting 
solely as regulators (Morrow and Idle 2008). In tennis, players reaped some 
economic powers from the sport bodies and created a more inclusive governance 
regime through their own organisations, the Association of Tennis Players (ATP) and 
the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) (Sorrentini and Pianes 2011).  
 
The global popularity of football 
So, how has FIFA achieved such level of power? While FIFA’s founders intended 
the sport body to be global regulator and organizer of a World Cup (Eisenberg 
2006a), FIFA’s regime has benefited from larger socioeconomic trends. FIFA’s 
power rests substantially on the global popularity of football itself. FIFA has 209 
member FAs and the World Cup is followed by several hundred million people 
(Pielke 2013, 4). The rise of modern sports represents a byproduct of socioeconomic 
modernization creating more need and better opportunities for recreation and 
entertainment. Thus, after being codified in the British elite schools in the 19
th
 
century, association football became the game of the working class (Holt 1989; 
Taylor 2005).  
Football’s global migration benefitted from the game’s simple character, low 
infrastructure requirements (Giulianotti 1999) and the cultural hegemony of the 
British Empire (Guttmann 1994). Recently, key actors in the football industry 
actively developed new markets (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004). Finally, football’s 
popularity results from a highly symbiotic relationship with modern media industries 
(Cowie and Williams 1997). Global diffusion has created national football industries, 
in which a substantial share of the electorate has emotional stakes.  
The Politicization of International Sports  
FIFA’s ability to monopolise governace and regulatory power, hence confronting 
national governments also results from the politicization of international sports that 
intensified since WWII (Tomlinson and Young 2006). Sport, and in particular 
football, is prone to politicization because it can serve as symbol of cohesion and 
exclusion (Giulianotti 1999). Thus, international sport turned into a cold war arena 
after the Soviet government decided to participate in the 1952 Olympics in order to 
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broadcast the message of communist superiority (Allison and Monnington 2002). 
Moreover, participating in international competitions came to equal being recognized 
as sovereign state. Accordingly, East Germany used its athletes as ‘diplomats in 
training suits’ to gain diplomatic recognition (Balbier 2005), China perceived any 
appearance of Taiwan in international sport as an infringement of its sovereignty 
(Homburg 2006) and fielding its own national football team occupied a central 
symbolic role during decolonialization (Darby 2002). More recently, one of the first 
decisions of the Kosovo authorities following their declaration of independence was 
to apply for membership of UEFA and FIFA as soon as possible. Hence, 
international sport bodies have been often among the first international organizations 
new nation states aim to join (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998a, 305). Sport’s persistent 
relevance for identity politics is also illustrated by the feel good factor for the United 
Kingdom created by the 2012 Olympics and by Qatar’s attempts to use the 2022 
World Cup to rise in the international political and business scene (Amara 2012).  
 Thus, international sport governance has insofar shaped the preferences of 
political actors as these have ‘discovered’ sport as vehicle of identity politics. The 
political interests in sport’s symbolic benefits might not only turn in support for 
institutional maintenance but the ability to withdraw symbolic benefits is likely to 
create a power resource for the international sport bodies.  
FIFA has attained strong (and almost monopolistic) powers due to the popularity of 
football and the politicization of sport that public authorities seek to reap benefits 
from. But there is more to that, as FIFA has been able to generate positive feedback, 
developing an institutional framework of closely related stakeholders with an interest 
in maintaining it. To complete our analysis, it is necessary to now, albeit briefly, the 
constitution and dynamics of that process, which has cemented FIFA governance and 
regulatory powers. 
Who governs through FIFA? 
The needs institutions were created to meet differ from the ones they are pressed to 
meet at a later historical juncture (Thelen 2004). In FIFA’s case, broader political 
and socioeconomic changes culminated in a far-reaching institutional transformation 
from a gentlemen’s club into a global TNC. First of all, decolonialization created a 
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multitude of new FIFA members. Due to FIFA’s one-vote-per-nation principle 
(Eisenberg 2006a), the new members became a key electoral constituency 
demanding a more equal distribution of World Cup places and host locations and an 
increase in FIFA subsidies. The Europeans FAs lost their long-standing dominance 
of FIFA, when they failed to respond to these demands (Darby 2003). 
 Moreover, a number of TNCs, most prominently Adidas, pushed for 
institutional change. These TNCs were attracted by the commercial prospects of the 
World Cup that were only hesitantly exploited by FIFA’s European leadership 
dedicated to amateurism. This combination of aggrieved interests allowed Brazilian 
IOC member and business magnate João Havelange to take over the governing 
body’s presidency in 1974. Havelange promised the new FIFA members an increase 
in World Cup Finals places and financial and technical aid (Tomlinson 1994; Sugden 
and Tomlinson 1998a, b). Since Havelange’s agenda implied a commercialization of 
international football, his campaign was heavily supported by TNCs (Sugden and 
Tomlinson 1998b).  
Havelange’s election represented a decisive turning point; it ‘closed off 
alternative options and led to the establishment of institutions that generate self-
reinforcing path-dependent processes.’ (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 341). FIFA’s 
new strategy aimed at the total commercial exploitation of the World Cup and a 
centralization of FIFA’s control over revenues. Accordingly, FIFA’s agenda became 
increasingly shaped by commercial interests (Sugden and Tomlinson 1997; Sugden 
2002; Murray 1999). Thus, a small network of profit-maximizing sponsoring TNCs 
defines strict parameters for countries hosting a World Cup including legal 
exemptions, which are enforced by FIFA (Cornelissen 2010). Moreover, FIFA 
entered long-term business relations with TNCs in order to even-out FIFA’s revenue 
streams over the World Cup cycle (Eisenberg 2006a; Homburg 2008).  
After FIFA’s institutional transformation distributional politics came to 
dominate FIFA’s politics (Darby 2003, 14). The new FIFA leadership took pains to 
meet the financial expectations of its constituency and used its heavily improved 
revenues to grant substantial development aid to member FAs (Eisenberg 2006a, 
2000b). Moreover, FIFA became independent of monetary contributions of member 
FAs, which reduced the political influence of the FAs and enabled the FIFA 
executive to ‘organize majorities’ through distributional policies (Eisenberg 2006a; 
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Giulianotti and Robertson 2012) or even blatant ‘vote buying’ (Pielke 2013). The 
funds allocated to member FAs might not appear large, but are substantial for 
developing countries (Pielke 2013, 7). Football’s commercialization has been insofar 
successful as it increased the football’s global visibility as well as FIFA’s 
membership and ability to sponsor grassroots sport, which secures member FAs’ 
loyalty (Eisenberg 2006a, 2006b).  
Thus, a coalition of new internal constituencies and external commercial 
interests having a common interest in football’s commercialization governs through 
FIFA. It has developed a governance regime of positive effects which is mostly away 
from public regulation. This is of course a self-reinforcing circle that its constituents 
seek to maintain. The institutional setting can be considered as self-reinforcing 
because it generates profits and subsidies for FIFA’s dominant coalition. These 
actors have a vital interest in supporting FIFA’s policy to maintain concentrated 
control over international football and its revenues (Madeira 2007, 288). Whilst any 
political support from governments may be welcome (eg. public funding 
contributions to organize the World Cup), regulation always risks de-stabilising the 
existing positive institutional arrangement. 
Exercise and effects of FIFA’s power 
FIFA’s power becomes in particular visible when the sport body perceives its 
regulatory position challenged. But what happens if public authorities decide they 
have a legitimate reason to regulate aspects in the governance system of football? 
This has happened often at national level. Within football’s multilevel governance 
exist institutional mechanisms allowing FIFA to enforce compliance by national FAs 
but also national FAs to ‘move up’ conflicts with their national governments. FIFA’s 
statutes demand independence from any third parties as a pre-requisite for national 
FA’s membership. FAs not deemed to ‘manage their affairs independently and 
ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties’ (FIFA 2012: 
Article 13.1 g) might be suspended by the FIFA Executive Committee or the 
Congress (FIFA 2012, Article 14).  
 In order to sketch-out the dimension of the problem at stake, we traced 
conflicts between FIFA, national FAs and governments within the last decade (2003-
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2013). The year 2005 can be considered a watershed moment, as FIFA decided to 
implement a strategy to defend the autonomy of football over public authorities. In 
2005, the 55
th
 FIFA Congress legitimated the creation of a Task Force to address 
contemporary problems of football (FIFA, 2005b). Among others, ‘the quest for 
autonomy by some leagues and political interference’ required ‘appropriate solutions 
to fortify the Associations on a long-term base’ (FIFA, 2005a). In 2006, FIFA 
adopted a declaration to defend the autonomy of sport (FIFA, 2006). FIFA demanded 
national governments to guarantee FAs’ control over national leagues and even 
defined a deadline for legal adjustments: 
‘Nations with sport legislation in place that does not comply with the FIFA 
Statutes and especially where leagues are afforded a status whereby they are 
not subordinate to the football association (specifically, Greece, Poland and 
Portugal) shall have until 15 July 2006 to amend the relevant legislation.’ 
(FIFA, 2005a) 
The Emergency Committee allows FIFA to quickly respond to non-compliance or 
political interference, whilst the Associations Committee (AC) continuously 
monitors member FAs and public authorities. FIFA has the power to suspend 
membership of countries where the autonomy of football and FAs from public 
authorities is not respected from the governing body’s point of view. A rare press 
release on the Associaotions Committee’s activities reported: 
‘In total, 14 cases were discussed, out of which four were closed, five related 
to governmental interference, four to internal problems within member 
associations and one was a specific matter.’ (FIFA, 2008b) 
Unfortunately, FIFA’s monitoring of conflicts with political authorities cannot 
completely be traced since the AC files are not fully accessible. FIFA’s press 
releases indicate that the AC invokes the threat of a suspension frequently in order to 
enforce FIFA’s demands. A threat often suffices to guarantee compliance as 
indicated by FIFA: 
‘[T]hrough monitoring, communication and reactivity, FIFA can try to 
prevent the emergence of a crisis. FIFA is a strong organization, not only in 
its football realm, but also in the political, socio-economical world, and we 
can and should use this strength to help our members.’ (FIFA, 2011) 
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Available data allows us to infer the following patterns. First, conflicts between 
FIFA, national FAs and governments are not sporadic, nor a rare occurrence. Second, 
FIFA employs two types of action: threat of suspension and formal suspension of the 
affected country, which are much better reported. FIFA imposed 24 suspensions over 
the last ten years (Table 1). Furthermore, at least six FAs have been threatened with 
suspension.
1
  
 
***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Third, ‘governmental interference’ represents by far the most important trigger for 
suspension. The notion is, however, broadly defined. Whereas FIFA depicts political 
interferences as primarily resulting from dissatisfaction with sporting performances 
(FIFA, 2011), political interference also includes legislative acts adopted by 
parliaments as well as judicial actions against FAs or their officials.  
Fourth, suspensions seem to be an effective way to enforce FIFA’s demands. 
A very short period passes between a suspension and a lift and the annual FIFA 
Congress has only confirmed two suspensions (2005: Yemen, 2009: Brunei-
Darussalam). More importantly, the outcomes of the conflicts tend to be in line with 
FIFA’s demands. FIFA also defines the agenda for the process following a 
suspension. While FIFA aims to involve all relevant stakeholders, it insists on an 
uncompromised implementation of agreements that are in line with its own statutes.  
However, in order to understand FIFA’s use of its power more detailed 
process tracing is needed. Therefore, we present three in-depth case studies on 
FIFA’s actions against ‘governmental interference’ in Greece, Spain and Poland. The 
rationale behind selecting European countries is twofold. First, we deal with 
countries where the rule of law is accepted. Second, all cases examined involve states 
that the VOCASPORT Research Group (2004) has classified as ‘bureaucratic 
configuration’ of sport policy-making. Here, sport bodies are supposed to act as 
agents for delivering government specified requirements, and they are accountable to 
the state (Henry and Ko 2009, 30-35; Henry 2009), yet FIFA and national FAs are 
able to challenge that power.  
Our cases also offer variance as to the nature of governmental interference 
(formal application of state law in Spain, political rivalry in Greece, and corruption 
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in Poland) and to the intensity of FIFA’s intervention (purely informal threats: Spain, 
formal threats: Poland and full formal suspension: Greece).  
FIFA vs. Greece, a Long Standing Conflict 
The Greek case illustrates FIFA’s ability to gain a regulatory exception for its 
governance domain. FIFA’s conflicts with Greece have prolonged since 1990. In 
2006, FIFA finally suspended the Hellenic Football Federation (HFF) because of 
government interference (FIFA 2006a), although the decision was reversed just a 
week after (FIFA 2006b). 
 
Early Conflicts. The governance framework of football in Greece was created in 
1979, with the adoption of Law 789/1979. The football sector did not oppose the law, 
as it also granted public funding (Anagnostopoulos 2011, 211-2; Dimitropoulos 
2006, 56-57; 2010, 7-9). In the early 1990s the Greek government aimed to update 
governance structures in the face of sport commercialization and scandals related to 
match fixing. Hence, in 1993 the government proposed legislation to overhaul the 
nomination of referees for league and cup matches and the composition of sport 
disciplinary courts (Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006a, 8; 2006b, 190). The 
HFF did not accept the proposed measures and involved FIFA. FIFA threatened to 
suspend the HFF implying an exclusion from 1994 World Cup on grounds of 
excessive state intervention. In result, the government abandoned the proposed 
legislation (Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006a, 8). 
 
Second Attempt to Regulate Greek Football Governance. In 1999 the Greek 
government again decided that professional sport was in need of a tighter regulatory 
framework, proposing a new National Sports Act (Law 2725/1999) (Panagiotopoulos 
and Mourniakis 2006a, 8). The law intended to give the state a greater oversight in 
governance structures of professional sports (Dimitropoulos 2010) and included 
detailed provisions on the composition of disciplinary committees, and on election, 
dismissals and incompatibilities for members of the HFF board (Panagiotopoulos and 
Mourniakis 2006a, 8-9).  
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In response to a complaint by the HFF, FIFA demanded the Greek 
government on 19 March 2001 to ‘immediately refrain from interfering with the 
affairs of the HFF’ (FIFA 2001a). A strict deadline was defined: 
This undertaking has to be made by the Greek government not later than 30 
March 2001. Furthermore, FIFA requests that the required provisions or 
amendments to Greek sports legislation should be carried out and be in place 
by 25 April 2001. (FIFA 2001a) 
FIFA threatened to suspend the HFF ‘from all international football activities’ (FIFA 
2001a), including the upcoming 2002 FIFA World Cup. The Greek government 
responded swiftly, which resulted in a meeting at FIFA’s Zurich headquarters 
chaired by President Blatter and attended by the Greek Secretary of State for Sport 
and the HFF Chairman (FIFA 2001b). The parties agreed to reform of the Greek 
Sports Act and committed themselves to negotiate a solution in good faith within 
three months. FIFA became the negotiations’ agenda-setter, as the joint declaration 
stipulated that the working group should act ‘on basis of an action plan proposed by 
FIFA’(FIFA 2001b).  
 An agreement was finally signed early in August 2001. According to FIFA, 
the negotiations resulted in normalizing ‘the relations between Greek football and the 
country’s governmental authorities in line with the FIFA Statutes and regulations’ 
(FIFA 2001c, italics added). The government was given a strict deadline to adapt the 
legislation by mid-January 2002. Finally, the government watered down its initial 
proposals and left the structures of the HFF mostly unchanged (Panagiotopoulos and 
Mourniakis 2006a, b).  
 
Third Round: FIFA Suspends Greece. After the conservative party New Democracy 
gained power in spring 2004 – just months before the Athens Olympics – sport 
became a top issue in Greek politics. Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis ‘took 
personal charge of the preparations for the Olympic Games’, seizing at the same time 
control of the culture ministry (responsible for sport) and appointing personal allies 
in key positions within the public sports sector (Carr 2004).  
The government also proposed new changes to the National Sports Act. Sport 
federations in the country were given six months to amend their statutes, including 
election systems (Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006b, 190). Anagnostopoulos 
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(2011, 212) suggests that one of the motivations of this new legislation was political 
rivalry over the control of the Greek FA. The incumbent HFF chairman, Vasilios 
Gagatsis, felt that the amendments reduced his chances for reelection. After elections 
to the HFF were finally held without changes in the electoral system, the Greek 
minister for sport withheld all state funding of the HFF. Again HFF complained to 
FIFA (Anagnostopoulos 2011, 212-3).  
 In September 2005, FIFA gave Greece a deadline of 15 July 2006 to amend 
the legislation (FIFA 2005a; FIFA 2006a). When the Greek government failed to 
comply, FIFA formally suspended the HFF with immediate effect in July 2006 
(FIFA 2006a). While the Greek sports minister, Giorgios Orfanos, insisted on the 
government’s right to intervene in football governance (BBC Sport 2006), the 
suspension and the following social and political pressure to comply with FIFA’s 
demands prompted the Prime Minister to intervene personally (Anagnostopoulos 
2011, 214). Just eight days after the suspension, the Greek parliament amended the 
National Sports Act:  
‘Specifically, for the sport of football, all the subjects of functioning and 
organisation of the sport, the Hellenic Football Federation and its members 
are self-governed by the HFF and its bodies, according to its statutes and 
regulations, as well as those that are determined by the Union des 
Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) and the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), even if different regulations 
are provided in the law 2725/1999, as it is in effect in the athletic legislation. 
Subjects of audit for the subsidies that the HFF receives from the state, 
control of legality, public order and safety are subject to the exclusive 
competence of the state.’ (FIFA 2006b) 
 
Thus, FIFA lifted the suspension (FIFA 2006b). The evidence of this case suggests 
that FIFA suspension of Greece was the decisive factor to prompt the speedy reaction 
of the government and the Parliament. This is an interpretation shared also by others 
in the academic literature (see specially Anagnostopoulos 2011). The fact that FIFA 
had obtained a full exemption of the HFF from the most important piece of 
legislation that regulates the sport sector clearly indicates FIFA’s power. Football 
basically achieved an opt-out from framework legislation in the country. Whilst opt-
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outs from legislation are not rare to find, they demonstrate the bargaining power of 
the parties vis-à-vis the regulatory authorities.   
FIFA vs. Spain: Persuasion through the Press 
In Spain the regulation of the sports sector is laid down in the Spanish Sports Act of 
1990 (Law 10/1990), complemented with subsequent ministerial orders or decrees 
(Puig, Martínez and García 2010). The Spanish Sports Act includes very specific 
provisions regarding the governing structures of professional sport (García, Palomar 
and Pérez 2011). Such an ‘intrusive’ legislative framework made a conflict with 
FIFA very likely.  
The Act defines very specifically the roles and responsibilities of sport 
federations. Federations are described as private entities acting by delegation of the 
state (Law 10/1990, Article 30). Articles 30 to 40 of the Act prescribe the 
functioning and structures of Spanish sport federations. Ultimately, conflicts with 
FIFA arose in the spring of 2008 when the national team had already qualified for 
Euro-2008. 
 
Electoral Processes. The conflict had its origin in the regulation of the Spanish FA’s 
(SFF) electoral process. In December 2007 the government adopted a ministerial 
order regulating elections in all sport federations:  
‘Elections will be made to coincide with the year of celebration of the 
Summer Olympic Games, and must start within the first quarter of this year. 
However, the Spanish sports federations that participate in the Summer 
Olympics shall begin their elections within two months from the end of the 
Olympic Games’ (Ministerial Order 2007, article 2). 
With Spanish football not qualifying for the 2008 Olympics, the SFF was required to 
hold elections during the first trimester of 2008 (Expósito 2008a). However the 
incumbent president, Angel Villar, proposed to organize the elections in the autumn 
of that year (Mateo 2008a). That decision would not comply with the Ministerial 
Order, although only for a few months. The conflict about a technical detail gained 
increased public attention through constant reporting by the Spanish press of the 
conflict between the FA and the government (see Expósito 2008a, Mateo 2008).  
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FIFA’s Threat to the Spanish Government. In February 2008, FIFA President Blatter 
travelled to Madrid to pay tribute to football legend Alfredo Di Stéfano. During a 
press conference, Blatter commented on the conflict: 
‘This situation in Spain is incomprehensible. We fully support the federation 
and hope that the government understands the risk; FIFA’s Emergency 
Committee could meet in just six hours by phone or electronically to 
suspend the federation’ (quoted in Mateo 2008a). 
Blatter deemed the ministerial order an ‘unacceptable intervention in football 
matters’ and indicated possible consequences: ‘It seems as if the Spanish government 
does not want its national team and its clubs to participate in international 
competitions’ (quoted in Expósito 2008a). Blatter gave an informal but robust 
warning by comparing Spain with the suspension of Greece in 2006 (Expósito 
2008a; Mateo 2008a).  
The Spanish Secretary of State for Sport took first a strong stance: ‘I defend 
the sovereignty of the Spanish state and the rule of law; we shall respect and enforce 
the law, and Spanish sport shall be governed in Spain’ (quoted in Expósito 2008b, 
see also El País 2008). The ministry of sport even suggested that administrative 
sanctions could be imposed upon the SFF (Suárez 2008a). The FA, however, 
persisted. In March 2008 the Annual General Assembly (AGM) decided the 
presidential election would be held in November that year (Carbajosa 2008, Ávila 
2008). FIFA Executive Committee expressed its support for the SFF (Mateo 2008b):  
‘If [the Spanish government] take[s] any decision against the Spanish FA we 
will have to intervene, and I really do not want to do it. I hope that will not 
be the case’ (quoted in Mateo 2008b). 
Despite much talk through the press and other informal conducts, there were no 
formal proceedings. There is no evidence that the government ever formally 
considered any administrative sanction towards the FA. FIFA, on the other hand, 
certainly did not suspend Spain. There were no ‘formal’ threats of suspension either, 
as those often seen from the Associations Committee to other countries. Thus, it is 
difficult to explain how the conflict was resolved. The elections took place on 24 
November 2008, the preferred solution of the SFF and FIFA (Suárez 2008c). The 
government, however, was surprisingly at ease with that decision: ‘Those who think 
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that this delay is not complying with our own ministerial order are wrong’ (quoted in 
González-Martín 2008). 
There are suggestions of a ‘semantic pact’ between the SFF President and the 
Secretary of State for Sport (Suárez 2008b), but there are no public explanations of 
the government’s change of mind. Formally, the SFF presented a written submission 
to the government in April 2008, simply informing them of its decision to hold 
elections in November (Iríbar 2008). The Spanish case is one of implicit threats, 
unwritten rules and codes of behavior, which makes clear-cut analysis more difficult. 
Given the technical nature of the issue at stake, it is plausible that the government 
appreciated the unnecessary negative consequences that a formal FIFA intervention 
could have. Causality is always a complex concept in the social sciences, and 
interpretations will also depend on ontological and epistemological considerations. 
For the purpose of our paper it may not be possible to attribute the government’s 
change of heart exclusively to FIFA, but the evidence of the case suggests that it 
certainly contributed to it. The case illustrates the potential that the institutional 
system of football governance has to discourage public authorities from upsetting the 
power and role of the governing bodies. 
 
FIFA vs. Poland: Protecting Incapable Governance 
The Polish case has already been analyzed elsewhere (Kędzior and Szczepanik 2011, 
Włoch 2012). There is also an interventionist legislative framework for professional 
sport in Poland. The Bill on Physical Education of 1998 introduced a special ‘sport 
plc’ format for professional clubs and banned multiple club ownership (Kędzior and 
Szczepanik 2011, 205). The Law on Qualified Sport of 2005 granted the Minister of 
Sport substantial powers over sport associations (Radke 2009). Certain business 
contracts required ministerial approval if an association received public funding. 
Moreover, in case of violations of the law the minister could suspend the authorities 
of the association, withdraw its consent for the creation of an association or file a 
motion for a resolution of an association to a Polish court (Szwedo 2011, 63).  
While corruption has been an endemic problem within Polish football, its 
magnitude was revealed after the Polish penal code, in 2003, included the notion of 
‘sporting bribery’. Several hundred people including some top officials of the Polish 
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Football Association (PFA) have been charged because of match fixing and 
corruption (Kędzior and Szczepanik 2011, Włoch 2012).  
 
First Round: Responding to Governance Failures. The government decided to 
intervene when the Polish FA (PFA) only hesitantly addressed bribery. In January 
2007 the Polish minister of sport suspended the board of the PFA and assumed 
interim management until the elections. The incumbent board depicted the measure 
as a violation of the autonomy of sport and was supported by UEFA and FIFA, 
which demanded the removal of the government’s supervisors. FIFA threatened the 
government not only with suspension but also with denial of FIFA’s subsidies. FIFA 
demanded that the ‘internationally recognized administration’ of the PFA should 
organize elections under the supervision of UEFA and FIFA (FIFA, 2007). The 
government was also sent signals that Poland’s candidature for Euro-2012 might not 
be considered. Thus, the government removed their supervisor of the PFA (Kędzior 
and Szczepanik 2011, 211). 
 
Second Round: Intervening with Support from Polish Sport: Eighteen months later, 
the government tried again to intervene because of mismanagement and a hesitant 
approach to match fixing within the PFA (Włoch 2012). The government waited 
until UEFA had awarded Euro-2012 to Poland and intervened on 29 September 
2008, just one day before candidates for the PFA board were to be nominated. In 
order to legitimize the intervention, the government asked the Polish National 
Olympic Committee (NOC) to nominate a supervisor, rather than appointing the 
supervisor itself (Infotuba 2008).  
UEFA and FIFA refused to recognize the supervisor. They also asked the 
IOC to assess the autonomy of the Polish NOC (UEFA 2008). Furthermore, FIFA 
threatened Poland with exclusion from the 2010 World Cup and announced the 
cancellation of upcoming qualification matches (FIFA, 2008, WPROST 2008b). 
Initially, the Polish Sport Minister, Miroslaw Drzewiecki was confident of 
convincing UEFA and FIFA that violations of the law by the PFA justified the 
measure (Infotuba 2008a, WPROST 2008a). However, FIFA did not accept these 
arguments (WPROST 2008c). Moreover, UEFA threatened to withdraw Euro-2012 
from Poland (Kędzior and Szczepanik 2012, 212).  
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In a letter to the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, FIFA defined a clear 
deadline ‘of Monday 6 October at noon’ to remove the supervisor (FIFA 2008a). In 
response, Minister Drzewiecki demanded that the PFA had to respect the law and 
claimed: ‘you cannot supervise the fight against corruption and hooliganism if you 
break the law yourself’ (WPROST 2008d, e). Nevertheless, Drzewiecki negotiated 
with the incumbent PFA board. Finally, the government agreed to remove the 
supervisor once the independent election committee of the PFA (with participation of 
the Sport Ministry, FIFA and UEFA) had started preparing new elections. While the 
old PFA board had to admit some misconduct, the new PFA board tried to suspend 
all further investigation into corruption within Polish football in June 2009. Although 
the PFA’s general assembly voted the proposal down, the PFA’s stance towards 
corruption seems questionable (Kędzior and Szczepanik 2011, 212).  
Given the timing of the Polish case it is clear that the willingness to host 
EURO-2012 was decisive in the actions of the government. The case illustrates the 
positive effects that football governance system creates for its constituents. It creates 
political and economic value that national governments are happy to exploit when 
they can, even if they have to share their regulatory powers. Again, several factors 
have contributed in this complex case, not least because of the number of actors 
involved. The government has not fully explained its somewhat erratic actions, but it 
is clear that the final solution was in line with FIFA’s preferred outcome. It is 
therefore plausible to argue that FIFA’s pressure influenced the public authorities. 
The case, thus, demonstrates the agenda-setting powers of FIFA in the conflicts with 
governments.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The presented evidence indicates that FIFA is able to confront national governments 
and defend its autonomy to govern and regulate football. The factor most indicative 
of FIFA’s influence is the fact that case resolutions are invariably in line with FIFA’s 
preferred solution. Suspensions (or the threat of them) can serve as an efficient 
means to enforce compliance of national FAs and public authorities. Governments 
even modify their sport policy and legislation once they face opposition by FIFA. In 
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Greece, FIFA obtained a regulatory exemption for football; the Polish government 
accepted a relatively lenient stance towards governance failures in sport. In Spain the 
government simply preferred to avoid conflict when it escalated perhaps too much. 
Thus, the case studies reflect dynamics where elected national governments decided 
to modify their decisions when FIFA formally or informally requested so. Moreover, 
FIFA defines deadlines for governments to comply and devises road maps for 
conflict resolution. The evidence certainly suggests that FIFA is able to challenge 
public authorities. Of course, other factors have contributed to those decisions as 
well. But it is plausible to argue that the institutional power developed by FIFA in 
this system of governance, through the motives explored earlier in the article, was at 
least one, if not the main, contributing factor.  
 
Thus, the case of FIFA seems to be more supportive of older claims about the 
undermining effect of private power on legitimate public authority than of 
approaches abandoning simple dichotomies (cf. Büthe 2010).  
 Why do governments behave in such a way, and what does it tell us about 
transnational private (and sport) governance? There seem to be different dynamics at 
work. On the one hand, FIFA appears to benefit from the sociopolitical importance 
of football, that is, the sport’s global popularity and the political meaning ascribed to 
international sports. Historical analysis has traced how participation in international 
sport competitions has become increasingly important for national governments for 
purposes of identity politics. According to such a more sociological argument, 
football is the only sport in the world with which a large number of people 
emotionally identify on a year-round basis. In comparison to other international sport 
bodies, FIFA commands a unique concentration of powers allowing the sport body to 
control access to international football. Suspensions represent an efficient 
enforcement mechanism because the exclusion from international competitions has 
an economic impact for the FAs – due to FIFA’s redistribution policies but also due 
to losses of match revenues and probably players. 
Due to football’s strong popularity, it is safe to consider that suspension from 
a national team competition may not be well received by public opinion. There have 
been no cases of formal suspensions leading to exclusions from competitions, so it is 
not possible to test that causal link. However, the counter evidence is clear. The swift 
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responses of governments indicate that they prefer not to find out what would happen 
should their national team be banned from a competition. Within this context, it is 
useful to recall the history of Sevilla FC and Celta de Vigo in Spain in 1995 (see El 
Pais 1995). Administrative decisions relegated both clubs to play non-league football 
due to insolvency, which triggered public demonstrations of more than 250,000 
people in both cities. The details of the case are outside of the scope of this paper 
(the decision was eventually reverted), but this serves to confirm the importance of 
football, its links with public policy and the sensitivity of governmental authorities to 
the sociopolitical implications of the game. 
 However, while we can clearly demonstrate an effect of FIFA’s intervention 
on national sport policies, it is more difficult to ascertain how much of the power 
FIFA holds over national governments is economic and how much is symbolic since 
national governments were not keen to comment on their ‘surrender’. Yet, we have 
not located a single case where national governments decided to confront, face on, 
the positions of FIFA. Invariably, one after the other, case resolutions follow FIFA’s 
road map. While political ‘surrender’ could indicate the low strategic relevance of 
sport policy in some cases, it is undeniable that FIFA’s private transnational 
authority challenges state power. Moreover, there is no ‘governance triangle’ since 
civil society does not act as a corrective force in football’s private governance. Quite 
the opposite, while in other domains NGOs or legitimacy communities serve as ‘rule 
demander’ and supervisors of private regulators, FIFA presides over a large 
grassroots movement. National governments did not trust gaining voters’ support if 
their policies came at the cost of a suspension, which explains why FAs could 
escalate conflicts by calling on FIFA. Moreover, the governance triangle approach 
assumes that states or intergovernmental organizations actively try to orchestrate 
regulatory efforts (Abbott and Snidal 2008). While in our cases national governments 
were left on their own to confront FIFA, the governance triangle argument is insofar 
supported by the fact that supranational institutions, notably the European Union 
(EU), seem to fare better when it comes to shaping sport governance. The EU is 
probably the only governmental body that has been able to exert some form of 
authority over football bodies. The EU requested that FIFA amends its international 
transfer system to some extent (García 2011, Parrish 2003) and forced UEFA to 
negotiate over the selling of broadcasting rights (García 2008). However, FIFA has 
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also managed to reap concessions from the EU (Meier and García 2012).  Moreover, 
even though the EU’s intervention into football was triggered by clear-cut violations 
of community law, it was far from uncontroversial among the member states.  
However, persistent governance failures might also inspire states to assume a 
more active role in sport governance. As argued, FIFA’s expansive interpretation of 
illegitimate governmental interference results from the fact that FIFA is dominated 
by a coalition of actors who have a strong interest in maintaining concentrated 
control over international football and its revenues.  
 
 
However, FIFA’s political victories might prove problematic since some 
governmental interventions addressed serious governance failures. It appears highly 
questionable whether FIFA’s private transnational authority suffices to mitigate a 
global problem such as match fixing. The sheer magnitude of the problem might 
force FIFA to ask for support by public authorities. Moreover, as the case of doping 
illustrates, national governments can successfully join forces to reap regulatory 
powers from powerful sport bodies such as the IOC. However, it took a combination 
of persistent governance failures, blatant misconduct by officials and heavily 
increased public awareness to finally form a coalition of national governments 
(Hanstad et al., 2009; Hunt, 2011). 
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Table 1. FIFA’s suspension of member FAs 2003 – 2013 
Member FA Date of 
suspen-
sion 
Date of lift Trigger of suspension Outcome of FIFA intervention 
Azerbaijan 15-Apr-03 23-May-03 External pressure, violations of 
fundamental principles 
Parties agreed to respect a FIFA 
moderated agreement 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
20-May-03 29-Jun-05 No details provided Suspension lifted after situation 
had improved 
Guatemala 9-Jan-04 17-May-04 Governmental interference: 
Government replaced FA and 
elected FA officials  
Re-installment of elected FA 
leadership, recognition of FAs’ 
competencies 
Kenya 2-Jun-04 6-Aug-04 Governmental interference: 
Government replaced FA officials  
due to mismanagement and fraud 
Installment of a normalization 
committee to improve 
transparency and accountability 
Macau 15-Feb-05 6-Mar-05 Governmental interference: 
Non-specified 
Suspension lifted after 
negotiations 
Yemen 12-Aug-05 9-Nov-05 Governmental interference: 
Non-specified 
Suspension lifted after creation of 
a normalization committee and 
concessions by the government 
Greece 3-Jul-06 12-Jul-06 Governmental interference: 
National legislation granting 
professional league independence 
from FA was not revoked 
Legislation amended according to 
FIFA's demands 
Kenya 25-Oct-06 9-Mar-07 Governmental interference: 
Non-implementation of 
agreements, escalation of internal 
conflicts  
Government declares to abstain 
from further intervention, 
pending legal proceedings are 
withdrawn, reinstallation of 
elected officials. 
Iran 23-Nov-06 20-Dec-06 Governmental interference: 
Non-independence of decision-
making and election processes 
Creation of a transitory board and 
future implementation of FIFA's 
demands 
Kuwait 29-Oct-07 20-Dec-08 Governmental interference: 
Government replaced FA officials 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
after new elections are 
announced, reinstallation of 
FIFA’s transition committee, 
amendment of FA's statutes 
Albania 14-Mar-08 26-Apr-08 Governmental interference: 
Government initiated legal 
proceedings against new FA 
statutes 
Legal proceedings stopped, 
creation of a working-group 
Madagascar 19-Mar-08 19-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Ministerial decree dissolved FA 
Madagascan Supreme Court 
declared decree null and void, re-
installment of FA 
Chad 28-Mar-08 7-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Government replaced FA officials 
and intended to hold new 
elections 
Decree revoked, reinstallation of 
elected FA officials 
Iraq 26-May-08 29-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Governmental decree dissolved 
all sport organizations 
Exclusion of FA from dissolution 
decree 
Ethopia 29-Jul-08 Unknown Governmental interference: 
Dismissal of elected officials, 
non-compliance with FIFA 
roadmap 
Unknown 
Samoa 24-Oct-08 20-Dec-08 Repeated management problems Unknown 
Peru 25-Nov-08 20-Dec-08 Governmental interference:  
Non-specified 
Unknown 
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Brunei 
Darussalam 
29-Sep-09 1-Jun-11 Governmental interference: 
Dissolution of FA and creation of 
new government controlled body 
Conditions of FIFA Emergency 
Committee fulfilled and statues 
amended according to FIFA 
Statutes 
Iraq 20-Nov-09 19-Mar-10 Governmental interference: 
Government controlled NOC 
dissolved FA 
Dissolution of FA withdrawn 
El Salvador 11-May-10 27-May-10 Governmental interference: 
Government did not accept 
FIFA's normalization committee 
and new FA statutes 
Legitimacy of normalization 
committee and new statutes 
recognized 
Nigeria 4-Oct-10 8-Oct-10 Governmental interference: 
Court actions against FA officials, 
governmentally forced resignation 
of officials, government started 
league without relegation from 
previous season 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
after claimant withdrew legal 
actions and FA leadership and FA 
control over league were 
reinstalled 
Bosnia 1-Apr-11 1-Jun-11 Mismanagement due to ethnic 
divisions and rotating FA 
presidency 
FA statutes amended according to 
FIFA's demands 
Belize 17-Jun-11 7-Jul-11 Failure of government to provide 
security for national team matches 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
due to positive developments, 
match played outside Belize 
Cameroon 4-Jul-13 22-Jul-13 Governmental interference: 
Government refused to accept 
results of FA elections 
Normalization committee created, 
new elections organized, finally 
reinstallation of elected FA 
officials 
Notes: Information displayed here is based on minutes of the FIFA Congress and FIFA’s 
press and media releases (cf. online appendix for details).  
 
 
 
1
  These FAs are Cambodia, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia and Venezuela. 
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